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Abstract
Web cachescurrently deployed on the Internetoperateundera pull model in
which client requeststreamsdeterminethe contentof the cache.An alternative
pushmodel would allow web servers to pro-actively replicatetheir contentsto
caches.Giventhefinite amountof cachespace,a questionarisesasto which ob-
jectsshouldbe kept in cache.In [6], the authorsproposea pushcachingmodel
wherebythe contentof the cacheis determinedby participatingserversin a co-
operativefashion.In thispaperweexploreanauction-basedschemethatachieves
an efficient allocationof disk spacebasedon utilities revealedby both content
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serversandwebcaches.We show thatour approachprovideshigheruservalua-
tion thantraditionalreplacementpolicieswithout sacrificingoverall hit rate. At
thesametime we solve thetruthful revelationincentiveproblemsassociatedwith
a cooperative approach.Our approachboth implementse-commercein caching
service,andimprovestheinfrastructurefor supportingothere-commerceby pro-
viding qualityof servicedifferentiation.





this paperwe describea modelwherebywebserversmayspecifywhich of their
contentsthey want cached.We call the former pull caching andthe latter push
caching. While pull cachinghasbeensuccessfullydeployed,we think therewill
be instancesin which pushcachingcould be very useful. The main motivation
behindpushcachingis that web serversmay have informationnot available to
eithertheclientsor thewebcaches.A server thatis aboutto releaseanobjectthat
is expectedto behighly popular, for example,thetrailer for anupcomingmovie,
anupdateto apopularsoftwarepackage,or aninfluentialgovernmentreport,may
want to have the object pushedto cacheson the Web before it announcesthe
availability of theobject.By doingpushcaching,not only will theserverprevent
itself from beingswampedby requests,it will alsodecreasethe downloadtime
experiencedby its clientsand,at thesametime,reduceoverallnetwork bandwidth
usage.1
Giventhefinite amountof spaceavailableat webcaches,whencachespaceis
fully utilized someexisting objectsmustbeevictedfrom thecacheto accommo-
dateanew object.Replacementpoliciesfor traditionalpull cachingrely onaccess
historyto maketheirdecisions.Theleastrecentlyused(LRU) policy evicts items
basedon their recency of use. The leastfrequentlyused(LFU) policy makesits
decisionbasedon eachobject’s frequency of use.With pushcaching,theserver-
s reveal privateinformation to help cachemanagerto make object replacement
decisions.This informationmight bebasedon accesshistories,but it might also
1“Pushcaching”is closelyrelatedto “mirroring”. However, mirroring usuallyrefersto a staticor
slow-changingreplicationof multiple objectsor anentiresite. Our notion of pushcachingallows a
granularityat the level of a singleobject,andis highly dynamicsoasto respondrapidly asnetwork
conditionsandobjectvalueor desirabilitychange.
incorporateotherinformationavailableto theserver but not partof thehistorical
accesslog.2
In [6], theauthorsproposedapushcachingschemein whichcontentserversco-
operatewith thewebcachesandwith eachotherto determinetherelativeranking
of pushedobjects.An objectis not pushedto thewebcachesunlessthedemand
for it exceedsa certainthreshold.Thevalueof this thresholdanddestinationsto
which objectsarepushedareperiodicallytunedby a centraladministrator. The
authorsshowedthatgeographicpushcachingcanreducenetwork traffic by 26%.
In this paperwe proposea market-basedpushcachingmechanismin which
cachespaceis auctionedoff to servers. Theadvantagesof usinga market-based
mechanismin pushcachinginclude:
1. The network (caching)resourcescanbe allocatedin orderto maximizethe
aggregatevaluethey provide to network users:well-designedmarketsyield
efficientresourceallocations.
2. A market mechanismdecentralizesthe cachespaceallocation decisions.
With thedistribution of allocationdecisions,serverscanemploy morecom-
plex functionsor largeaccesshistoriesin orderto predictfuturepopularity,
or to calculatethe valueper requestfrom putting specificobjectsinto the
cache.For example,LFU andLRU arevery simple,not generallyoptimal
forecastsof futurerequests.
3. A market mechanismalso allows for accesshistory to be kept at objec-
t serversandbe communicatedto the web cachesin the form of valueper
requestcomputedby theservers.
4. A server maychooseto computethe bid valueof an objectindependentof
its accesshistoryor otherindicatorsof expectedpopularity. For example,a
server thatwantsto reducethedownloadtimeof its objectmaydecideto bid
highevenif its clientpopulationis small. In general,thebiddercanintroduce
informationnot availableto acentralcachemanager.
In our earlier work [8] we proposedand investigateda market-basedweb
cachingsystemthatprovidesdifferentiatedquality of service,throughbasingthe
replacementpolicy on bids for the valueof hits. In this paperwe proposeand
investigateamarketmechanismbasedon thevalueof diskspacein thecache.
In [7] theauthorsproposeasystemin whichcachespacesaredistributedacross
the Internet. Web contentserverscanrent cachespacesto hold mirrors of their
2For example,information aboutthe expectedfrequency of useandvalue of latency for a new
object,like asoftwareupdate,thathasnoaccesshistoryby definition.
contents.Sincethis is a commercialproduct,no further detailsareavailableon
thearchitectureof thesystem.
Therehavebeenseveralpioneeringeffortsto applymarket-basedmechanismto
theallocationof computingresources uchascpucycles,disk space,etc.in both
stand-aloneanddistributedsystems[15, 11, 12, 3,2, 16, 9]. Severalresearchesas-
sertthattheuseof market-basedmechanismin allocationof computingresources
hasnot seenwide-spreadadoptionbecausethelimiting resourcesaresufficiently
inexpensive that they canbeover-provisioned.We believe thatover-provisioning
on theInternetwill not bepracticalfor at leastthreereasons:
1. By definition, resourceson a network aresharedresources.Unlike cpu or
disk spacefor which a usermaydecidenot to sharewith others,bandwidth
andcachespaceson the Internetmustbe sharedfor network communica-
tion to happen. Given the highly variableusagepatternon the Internet—
e.g.,someusersdownloadlarge imagefiles, othersrun video-conferencing,
while still othersonly usethe Internetto sendemail, to over-provision for
theworst-casedemandmeanslow bandwidthusersmustsubsidizethehigh
bandwidthusers.
2. While a useror an institutionmayover-provision resourcesfor its own use,
communicationon theInternetgoesthroughseveraladministrativedomains,
any oneof which maydecidenot to over-provision to carrysomeoneelse’s
traffic.
3. Network traffic hasvery high variance.Theauthorsof [10] have shown that
aggregatenetwork traffic is long-rangedependent,whichmeansit hasinfinite
variance.Over-provisioningfor theworst-casedemandwill requirea lot of
resources,which will behighly underutilizedmostof thetime.
For thesereasons,we think thatmarket-basedmechanismcanplay an important
role in pushcaching.
2 Web Model
We classify computerson the Web into threecategories: All requestsfor Web
pagesareinitiatedby browsers. Thepermanenthomesof Webobjectsareserver-
s. Cachesare machineson the Web that hold temporarycopy of Web objects




move previously pushedobjectsto thespacemanagedby LRU
initialize availablespaceto maxcachesize
collectbidsof  bidder, size,valueperbyte	
sortthebidsin descendingorderof valueperbyte
for eachbid in thesortedlist
if sizeis lessthanor equalto availablespace
acceptthebid
decrementavailablespaceby size
if theobjectin LRU space
retrieve it
else
askwinning server to pushobjectto cache
else
rejectthebid
if clearingpriceis not set




Figure1: Theuniformpriceauctionalgorithm.Noticethatthereis alwaysa bid with value-per-byteequalsto cache’s reserveprice.
if (200 != $htcode || ($method ne "GET" && $method ne "HEAD") ||
$logtag eq "TCP_DENIED" || $logtag eq "TCP_NEGATIVE_HIT" ||
$logtag eq "TCP_CLIENT_REFRESH" || $logtag =˜ /ˆUDP_/ ||
$logtag =˜ /ˆERR_/ ||
($url =˜ m!ˆhttp:! &&




Figure2: Perlcodeto filter NLANR accesslogs,usedwithin loopthatiteratesoverall requests.Theregularexpressionthatidentifiesdynamiccontentis similar to thatused
within theSquidcache.We rejectrequestswith HTTP reply codeotherthan200becausewe areinterestedin successfulrequestsfor datanot presentin browsercaches.
Thiscoderemoved38.1%of all requestsat thePA cachesite,41.7%at theSV site,and36.3%atUC.
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Periodically, cacheshold a uniform price auctionto determinewhich objects
to acceptfor pushedcaching.Beforea new auction,thecachecollectsbidsfrom
servers. The bids are3-tuplesof the form 
 server-id, size-of-object,value-per-
byte . Bids areranked in a descendingorderof value-per-byte. The  highest
biddersthat canfit in the availablespacearedeclaredwinners. If the cachehas
a non-zeroreserveprice,only bidderswith value-per-bytehigherthanthereserve
price are accommodated.The clearingprice would be either the larger of the
reservation price or the value-per-byte of the highestlosing bid. The winning
objectsare then transferredby the cachefrom the servers. Figure1 shows our
auctionalgorithm.
Spacenot usedto holdpushedobjectsis usedto hold objectspulledby clients;
thisspaceis managedusingtheLRU replacementpolicy. In thisstudy, weassume




pushcachingdeliversto servers,we conducteda numberof trace-drivensimula-
tionscomparingit with LRU, unweightedLFU andKelly etal.’sswLFU(for LFU
andswLFU, we usetime sincelast accessto breakties). As input we selected
threelargerequeststreamscollectedby theNationalLaboratoryfor AppliedNet-
work Research(NLANR) cachesat Palo Alto (PA), Silicon Valley (SV), andthe
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign(UC) during the period15 August–
28 August1998 [5]. We filtered the raw NLANR accesslogs by removing all
unsuccessfulrequestsandrequestsfor dynamiccontent;Figure2 shows theactu-
al Perlcodeusedfor this purpose.
NLANR accesslogsrecordthenumberof byteswritten to clientsfor eachre-
questratherthanthesizeof URLs, andthis field oftenvariesacrossrequestsfor
thesameURL (HTTP headersvary in size,URLs change,andclientssometimes
aborttransfersmanually).Wedefinethesizeof aURL to bethemaximumrecord-
edtransfersizeamongall requestsfor it.
3.1 Cache Parameters
Our cachehasthreeparametersto be setby the cacheowner: cacheoccupancy
periodlength,cachesize,andreserveprice.
A periodis thetimeintervalbetweenoneauctionandits successor. Thecontract
betweenthecacheandtheserversstatesthatthewinningobjectsof thelastauction
canstayin thecachefor oneperiod.Theauthorsof [6] settheir periodlengthto
30 minutes. In this paper, we usea periodlengthof 20 minutesandcachesizes
of 1, 4, 16,64,256and1024megabytes(MB).
For all the resultspresentedin Section3.3, we set the reserve price to 0. In
Section3.4,we look into theeffectof differentreserveprices.
3.2 Server Bidding Algorithms
First,weassumeall theserversweseein thetracearewilling to pushtheirobjects
to thecacheandthey will pushevery objectthathasa positive probability to be
requestedin thenext period.(A server is simply thehostnameor IP addresscom-
ponentof aURL, weobtainit by theshortPerlcodesegmentshown in Figure 3).
We furtherassumeall serversusethesamebiddingalgorithmin eachsimulation.
In our experimentswe considerthecasewhereserversarevery heterogeneous
in the valuethey placeon having their objectscached(   ). We do this by first
assigninga uniqueinteger identifier   to eachserver, thenassigningvalues 
to serversaccordingto theformula:
       
Theresultis that   aredrawn from theset  1, 10,100,1000,10000 .
Thefollowing subsectionsdiscussthebiddingalgorithmswe investigated.All
algorithmsaredesignedto forecastthenumberof futurerequestsof anobjectin
thenext period. We assumethat theproductof this number, theobjectsize,and
thevalue-per-byteof theserver would betheserver’s truevaluationof having an
objectcached.
3.2.1 Regressed on Last Hour (RLH)
For eachNLANR site,we first usethetracedated1–14August1998to compute
theregressioncoefficientsof eachobject.Theregressioncoefficientsarecomput-
edassuminglinearmodel:   ! "# ! $% , where% is thenumberof requestsfor
theobjectin the lasthour, and  is thenumberof requestsfor thesameobjectin
thenext 20minutes.Table1 lists thecomputedregressioncoefficients.
To computethevalue-per-bytefor eachobject,a serverfirst computesthelike-
lihood thatanobjectwill berequestedin thenext 20 minutesfrom theregression
coefficients( ! " & ! $ ) computedabove anda traceof the lasthourrequests(% s) for
its objects. The value-per-byte of eachobject is then obtainedby multiplying
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$url =˜ s/\/$//; # strip trailing slash
$url.= ’/’; # add back the / for easy regex
$url =˜ s!ˆ[a-z]+://!!; # remove ????:// at the beginning
$url =˜ m!ˆ([ˆ:/]*)!; # extract string up to ’:’ (followed by port #)
# or ’/’ (followed by path)
$server = $1; # make it the server name
Figure3: Servernameextractioncodesegment.
NLANR Trace ! " stddev ! " ! $ stddev ! $ R-squared
SV -0.302478 0.01117111 0.303812 0.00269519 0.7764
UC -0.293294 0.00988465 0.294441 0.00261484 0.6970
PA -0.230651 0.01064222 0.238905 0.00574836 0.4131
Table1: RegressionParametersfor differentNLANR traces.
' ! "# ! $% ( of the objectwith the server’s valuationof having its objectscached
(   ).
3.2.2 Perfect Foresight (PF)
We arealsointerestedin knowing theperformanceof thesystemif all theservers
know theexactnumberof requestsin thecoming20 minutes(  ). Thevalue-per-
bytewill thenbe computedas    . This shouldgive usan upperboundon how
well thesystemcanperform,in thattheserversareactuallybiddingaccordingto
their true valuationsin this case;whereasin the otheralgorithms,they areonly
estimatingtheir truevaluations.
3.2.3 Limited Perfect Foresight (LPF)
Finally, weareinterestedin aperformanceupperboundontheclassof algorithms
thatlooksbackonehour, for example,theRLH algorithm.Hereweallow servers
to look into thenext 20minutesbut only submitbidsfor objectsthatalsoappeared
in thelasthour.
3.3 Results
To evaluatewhetherour systemdelivershigherwelfare thannon-market based
systems,we defineametriccalledvaluerateas:
)  * 
)  + 
Here   is asdefinedabove,*  the amountof data(in bytes)browsersobtained
from thecacheasopposedto from server , , and+  is thetotalamountof datatraffic
(in bytes)seenatserver , . Weassumethebenefitserver , receivesfrom cachingis
equalto thetotalbenefitsbrowsersusingserver , receivefrom cache,henceserver
, ’s utility functionis -  '*  (   . *  .
Figures4, 5 and 6 showsthatin termsof valuerate,market-basedpushcaching
with all serversusingthesameRLH biddingalgorithmdoesbetterthanLRU and
LFU from 1MB to 16MB. This is becausethecacheis congested.In otherwords,
the total sizeof bids submittedto an auctionis muchbiggerthanthe cachesize
andresultsin a high clearingprice. The averagetotal bid sizesper auctionare
327.915MB,246.636MBand287.364MBfor SV, UC, andPA sitesrespectively.
Thecorrespondingaverageclearingpriceareshown in Table2.
We seethat the swLFU algorithm, which is not incentive compatible, out-
performsRLH for nearlyall cachesizes. This is not surprisingbecausewe run
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Figure6: Byte hit rateandvaluehit rateasfunctionof cachesizefor LRU, LFU, swLFU,PushCachingwith RLH andPushCachingwith LPF at PA NLANR cachesites.
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With PerfectForesight(PF)hit rateis limited only by thefinite cachesize;where-
aswith lessthanperfectforesight,thefirst anobjectis requested,it will resultin
a mandatorycachemiss.
The performanceof pushcachingconvergesto that of LRU when the cache
sizeis large. This is correctbecausetherestof thespacein thecachethat is not
filled up by winningobjectsis managedby LRU. Sincethetotal bid sizefor each
periodunderRLH algorithmis fixed,theincreasingcachesizeleavesmostof the
cachemanagedby LRU. Hence,it is not surprisingthatour pushcachingsystem
degeneratesto a normalLRU-managedcache.This is a desirablefeaturebecause
thecachewill togglebetweenpull- andpush-cachingdependingon demand.
3.4 Reserve Price Analysis
If the goalof thecachemanageris to improve the welfareof thesysteminstead
of its revenue,it cansetanon-zeroreserveprice.Theeffectof anon-zeroreserve
priceis visibleonly whentheofferedloadto thecacheis nearcapacity. Whenthe
offeredloadis muchhigherthancapacityandthecacheis heavily congested,the
clearingpricecouldpotentiallyalreadybemuchhigherthanthereserveprice;on
the otherhand,if offeredload is below capacity, the cacheis not congestedand
all objectscanbecached.Figure 3.4shows that for a cachenearcapacity, some
valueof reservepricecanimprovebothbytehit rateandvaluerate.
4 Future Work
We plan to implementour modelon the Squid[4] web cache,usingAuctionBot
[13] to run theauctions.We envision that thereareat leasttwo possiblewaysto
implementoursystem.Thefirst onetakesade-centralizedapproach,for different
flavorsof webcaches,patchesarewritten to enablethemto run auctionsandun-
derstandthebiddingprotocols.In this case,serverswould directly communicate
with thewebcaches.In contrast,thesecondapproachis centralized,therewould
be oneauctioneerthat representsa clusterof web caches.It would be responsi-
ble for decidingwhich objectsshouldbe replicatedat a particularcache.Either
approachhasits own advantagesanddisadvantages.Furtherstudiesor realworld
experimentationsarerequiredto studythe merit of differentimplementationap-
proaches.Oneway to determinewhich modelis the bestwould be to studythe
overheadgeneratedby eachapproach.
Another territory of our future work is to comeup with suggestionsto help





















Effect of Different Reserve Prices on 64MB cache using sv trace
byte hit rate
value rate
Figure 7: Effect of Different Reserve Priceson byte hit rate and value rate at
64MB SV site.
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Trace cachesize(MB) 1 4 16 64 256 1024
SV 16042.8 4030.45 732.972 9.50620 0.0469305 0
UC 11464.6 4030.45 442.811 36.1828 0.178155 0
PA 5515.89 2289.29 268.702 40.9102 0.110929 0
Table2: Averageclearingpricefor theauctionsheldin threeNLANR cachesites.
work in the server-initiated replicationliterature[14, 1]. We believe the work
donetherewould help us give advicesto serverson the bid calculation- in our
case,it would bethevaluationof replicatinganobjectin awebcache.
We alsolike to deviseanefficientway to allow winningobjectsto authenticate
to theappropriatewebcacheproxies.
Apart from securityconcerns,we alsoneeda morerealisticserver valuedis-
tribution thanthe 1, 10, 100,1,000and10,000we used.Anotherdirectionis to
improve our currentbiddingalgorithms.With moreinformationanda moreso-
phisticatedpredictionalgorithm,wemaybeableto betterapproachtheidealcase
of perfectforesight.
Furthermore,we feel that a betterway to model the reserve price of a cache
would make it morerealistic. For example,we canchangeour cacheownerto a
profit-maximizingagentinsteadof a welfare-maximizingone.
5 Conclusion
Motivatedby theneedto provideserverstheautonomyto replicateobjects,wede-
velopedamodelthatallowsa proxycacheto acceptpushedobjectsfrom servers.
The pushcachingsystemis simpleandhighly flexible. While pushcachingre-
quiresbiddingprotocols,it remainstransparentto thebrowsers.Hencenochanges
to existing protocolsarerequired.
To tackle the incentive problem, we introducea pricing mechanismfor the
cachespace.The incentive compatibility of the mechanismensuresthat servers
aretelling theirtruevaluations.Sinceserversarebiddingontheir interestandtheir
benefitis directly proportionalto the frequency of future requestson the pushed
objects,oursystemeffectively delegatesthecomputationaloverheadof managing
cachesto the servers. Our simulationresultsshow that even with a very simple
forecastingmodel,market-basedpushcachingis able to deliver higherwelfare
thantraditionalcachemanagementpolicies.
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